Further to this post (note no Canadians with NATO’s continuing substantial Afghan training mission), President Obama’s fervent wish to decamp to the greatest extent possible keeps getting, er, challenged by the situation on the ground:
Kunduz Residents [in north] Live in Fear of Taliban’s Return
Sangin [Helmand in south] ‘on verge of falling back into Afghan Taliban hands’
Outgoing Afghanistan [commanding American] general: U.S. military needs to do more to beat back Taliban
Plus another, broader, angle:
Pakistan’s Hand in the Rise of International Jihad
There’s also the Indo-Pak, along with China, Great Game aspect:
Afghanistan and India and China: Great Games?
India vs Pakistan, RAW vs ISI: Baluchistan, Karachi, Kashmir Elsewhere
Why India Transferred Attack Helicopters to Afghanistan
India’s attack helicopter transfer to Afghanistan suggests a new era in ties between New Delhi and Kabul.
4-nation meeting [in Islamabad] on Afghanistan ends with call for direct talks with Taliban
But given the apparently difficult military situation for the Afghan government what real incentives do the Talibs–and their Pakistani enablers–have to engage in any serious compromising?